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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

DAVlD G. pJj;ARSOX and fjJL\'A P.
PEARSOK,
P/.aintiffs awl AptJefhmlN,

-vs.-

SALT LAKE ·COUNTY, a municipal
corporation, BOARD OF COTJN'rY
CO:J.fMI~SIONERS OF SALT \ Case Xo. 9042
LAKE COT~NTY and LAMO~TT B.
GCNDERSEN, EDWIN Q. CA~NON
and A B l'tA~l BARKER, ~fEMBERR
OJ<' THE BOARD OF COL'XTY
COJ\1 :rvtiSSIOXERR OF SAL'f
LAKJ<: COUNTY.
Defendants and Re~>pondents.
-----~

BRIEF OW OEFE)[DAXTS AND RESPO)[DENTS

OF FACTS
Defendani s concur in the statement of fads appear·
ing in plaintiffs' brief. In their brief defendants will pre~ent their argumenh in the fla:tne order as the arguments
which they refute appear in plaintiffs' brief.
STATJ:<.;:Jf]~::\T

STA'l'E.\n~NT

OF POLNTS RELIED UPON

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT NO. I
NONUNIFORMITY OF IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN THE
DISTRICT DO.ES NOT AFFECT THE DETERMINATIOX OF
TliBJ PROPER PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE TOTAL
COST OF THE IMPRO"\'R:ifENT.
POINT NO. II
ASSESS:'\IENTS OR TAXES FOR DRIVEWAYS AS CONTE:I.'IPLATED BY THE PROGRAM DO NOT VIOLATE SECTION 5 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE CTAH CONSTITUTIOK
OR ANY OTHER PROVISION OF THE STATE OR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION AS A:-1 ASSESSMENT OR TA.X FOR A
PRIVATE PURPOSE.
POINT NO. III
'I'HE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED BY SECTION 26 OF
CHAPTER 7 OF TTTLE 17, UTAH CODE A:-JKOTATED, 1953,
AS AMENDED, WOULD NOT CAL'SE ANY VIOLA'l'ION OF
SECTI0:-1 3 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTI0:-1, WHI-CH PROVIDES FOR AN ELECTION ON THE INCURRING OF INDEBTEDKESS BY CER'I'.'\IN GOVERNM8NTAL SUBDIVISIONS.
POINT NO. IV
THE ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS PROVIDED BY CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS
AMENDED, DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DEBT LIMITATION
OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE UTAH CONSTITLTION.
POINT NO. V
THE FACT 'THAT SECTION 26 OF CHAPTER 7 OF
TITLE 17, UTAH ·CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS AMENDED,
SPECIFIES THAT THE TAX TO G"C'ARANTEE PAYMENT
OF THE BONDS BE LEVIED UPON REAL PROPERTY DOES
NOT RENDER THE ACT INVALID.
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POINT NO. VI
THE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED RY SECTION 26 OF
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AS A:\-IENDED, WOULD NOT BE TO PAY A PRIVATE DEBT
IX VIOLATION OF ANY SECTION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
POINT NO. VII

THE SPECIAL TAX LEVY TO PAY BONDS WHEN
NECESSARY TO PREVENT DEFAULT CAN BE MADE
WITHOUT VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDJlEKT TO TilE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION OR SECTION 7 OF ARTiCLE 1 OF
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
POIKT NO. VJIT

THE PRIORITY OF ASSESSMENTS PROVIDED BY
SECTION 17-7-19 UTAH CODI£ ANNOTATED, 1953, AS
A:.ilENDED, IS NOT INVALID AND DOES NOT INVALI·
DATE THE ACT.
POINT NO. IX
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, AS AMENDED, IS NOT SO VAGUE AND CNCERTAIN
AS TO BE INOPERATIVE AND VOID.
POIKT X
IN THE EVENT THAT ANY O):[E OR MORE PORTIONS

OF THE ACT SHOULD BE HELD INVALID THE
DER SHOULD BE UPHELD.

REThiA!~

ARG1::JILXT
POINT NO. I
NONUNIFORliil'l'Y OF IMPROVEJ\IENTS WITHIN" THE
DISTRICT DOES NOT AFFECT' THE DETERMINATION Q}'
THE PROPER PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF THE TOTAL
COST OF THE IMPROVE;'\IENT.
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The fact that di!'!'erent p1eces of property are to
have different improvemeni~ made thereon does not show
that any property owner muf'l bear more than his proper

proportionate

~haec

of the total

co~t

of the improvement.

Plaintifis ::;how no cvidcuce that an) person was in fact
n~i<l'S~cU more than his proportionate ::;hare J'or the work
to lJe done on the public Iight of way abutting his prop-

erty.
AU of tlwse various improvements could have been
carried on under separate assessment program::;, one program for curbs, gutters, sidewalks and driveways, one
program for curbs, gutters, and driveways, one program
for curbs, gutters, and sidewalks and another for curbs
and gutters only. To do RO would result in a great deal
of duplication of time and effort by engineers and lawyers, would have required a separate no! ice, hearing, advertisement for construction bids, eonslruetion contract
and bond i~r.ue for each pt·og'Yarn. Si.'\'eral ~mall bond
isr.ue~ would be less easy to ~ell and therefore bear higher intere;;t than one bond issue. Thus, the manner in
\\-hich the ~inglc program i~ being carried out is more
efficient and economical than a series of separate programs. Absent a speeific legislative declaration to the
contrary it sJwuld be a~sumed that the la11- permits the
count~· to lllflke the improvements in tlte most eHieient
way practicable.

Further, the nature of the projeC-t is such that it is in
fact one program. Sidewalk<; are being built where there
are no sidewulks and a1·c being omitted "\Yhere sidewalks
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now exist. A series of separate programs involving curbs
and gutters would face the pos~ibility that if one or two
programs were not completed the o:treet ·would be only
partially curbed and guttered, climinat.ing much of the
bencnt to the whole district from the curbs and gultero:
which benefit is largely dependent upon the completion

of the entire project. If driveways were put in a separatr.
program it might very well prove necessary, after curbs
had been put in place and after sidewalks had been laid
to tear up portions of the curbs and sidewalks, freshly
conshucted, in order to put in driveways rather than
proceeding semibly by putting all improvements in at

the same time with the same labor force pursuant t.o the
same plans and specifications.
Finally, at the trlal in the Distriet Conrl the 'vitncss
Kay (R-88) testified that installation of a driveway from
gutter to sidewalk "is always considered integral to the
project that's parl ol' it." The

~arne

witness abo testified

(R-84) that the <'ost to be a~sesscc: again;:1t each particular
property uwner for c·ttrb, gutter and sidewalk on the south
side of 48th SottUt was in the same proportion to the total
rost of curh, gutter and sidewalk on the south side of 48th
South as the front footage of sueh property owner bears
to the total front footage on· the South Side oi' 48th South.
~fr. Kay also testified (R-86) that the same thing woulrl
he t1ue for the Xorth side of 48th South v.ith respect to
l'urb, gutter and sidewalk tR-AS). He also testified (R-93)
that the cost of each driveway to be assessed against a
particular property owner was in the same proportion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to total cost of all driveways as the area of each such
Jriveway bean; to the total area of all driveways.
lt i~ re~:;pectfully submitted that the improvements
contemplated comprise one program or project in fact.
'l'.hat the effect of the program varies from lot to lot does
not violate the statutory provision for proportionate
payments as each property owner must pay hig proportionate share of the cost of the improvement lo hili part ieular property. As plaintiff~ have not assailed the corrcetne~s of the computations attached to the complaint,
the finding by the Hoard of County Commis:;ioncrs in
Section ~ of the resolution adopted on April 21 after the
hearing, that no pic~e of property listed in the a~.oe~s
ment list will bear more than its proportionate :;hare of
the cost of the program should not be upset.
POINT NO. II
ASSESSMENTS OR TAXES FOR DRIVEWAYS AS CO:-l"·
TEMPLATED BY THE PROGRAM DO NOT VIOLATE SE'C..
TION 5 OF ARTICLE XIII OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
OR ANY OTHER .PROVISION OF 'THE STATE OR FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIO::-r AS A::-r ASSESSC.IENT OR TAX FOR A
PRIVATE P"C"RPOSE.

It

i~

well e:;tahlished that taws c.an be levied only
l"or )11Jblic purpOSl'~ but the faet that a public purpose also
grant~ ("f'rtain :;pl·tial hcT1efit~ to privatP persons, not
,;hn.l"ed by the community at large, does not destroy the
publie nature of the purpose insofar fiS the levY and collection of assessments therefor is concerned. The drive·
ways will not extend beyond the sidevm.lk, but will run
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only l rmn the sjdcwalk to the gutter. ~\11 such driveways
1dll be built on public property. Admittcdl) these drivclmy,; are of ~pecial benefit to the owner,; of the property
near whi1~h Jill'_\ arc builL Dnt ihe~e driveways liave
additional qualitie,; of benefit to the rest of the distrid
a~ a 11 hole. By fmpervi8ing their com;truction the county
can make s11rc that l.llP;.· arc ;.,o constructed as to provide
maximum drainage of the sidewalks, to provide minimum
wear and tear on the cm·bs and gutter6, and to pl·ovide
tJw minimum interference in the drainage of the street~
h_1· the eolleetion in the gllitcr of dry leavPfl, Proderl r;oil
and the like. Further, the dl'ivcways penn it ingTI'~6 and
egrc~s from and to the premises concerned by all the
public, not just the owners. The inclusion of driveway.-;
as a statutory purpose amount~ to a legislative l'inding
that they are a public purpose, and this l'inding should
not he set aside lightly.
0

"'l'he fmmdatiMt ol' the power to lay a ;;perial
asse;;sment or a special tax for a lor-a! improvement ol' any eharaeter, "' * * is the hcncl'it w11ieli
the object o[ the a.;sessment or tax con len; on the
owner of the abutting property, or the owners
of property in the assesf'ment. or special taxation
district. which if' different from the general benefit \1-hirh the ow11ers Pnjoy in rommon \Yith the
other inhabitant~ or ('iti~.rn~ of the municipal corporation." rvr cQuilli11, 111 unicipal CorprJrafions, 3rd
Ed. val. 1+ P. 1 9-20.
Be<'au~e

there musl be a private hencfi.t conferred
on t.he abutting property owner to -"ll[iport the theory
of special assessment, defendants contend that their adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mission that the owners will benefit from the special improvement uwlcr· consideration must not be twisted into
a concession that the driveways are not for a public purpose.
At the trial it was made manifest that the driveways
are built upon public property (R-95); that they serve
the interest~ of pubii(' safet_v and }H~alth; protect the
public curbs, gutters, roadway6 and sidewalks (R--94-95)
give the public access to private property (R-108) and
improve the general appearance of the community (R103). It follows, therefore, that the drive11·ay~ ~erve a
public purpose although resulting in a peculiar benefit
to the abutting private property.

PlainriJTf' cite no authority and defendants have been
able to find none for the proposition that the request and
1\'aiver signed hy the property owners shonld not be held
valid and enforceable. A tme copy of the form of waiver
is attarJwd to del'endant~' answer (H-69). ~\Jthough no
l~lah rase in point has been found on the subject defenil;tr:L; contend that a propert-y owner does have power to
waive an) right,; he may have to attack a special as~es~
ment. In C11r'ii11q 1-·. l'wlyfur, 1KI P. Hl, 1:':! Cal.151, U1e
plaintiff pr'O[JI.'I'ty owner cnt l'red into a 11 ritten agreement
11·ith tl1e con~truelion rompa11_1 pursunnt to which the
owner waived
''any right. ol' prnte~t. ng·nin~t tl1e performance of
said work IJy the part:· or tl1e seeondpart (defendant \Vor~~~·id;: :-3\reet. PaYing- Co1npan:·) under
said nmtract (l'or the doinp: of the work) or
ag-ain~t the assessment created under said resolution ol' intl•ution No. 105."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In upbolding the wa1vcr, the California Supreme
l'ourl said:
"lt will thu,., be ~Pen that the plainci~'C waived
every objection which might havR been made, in
limine, agaim>t t!Je validily of the aRsessrnen( dis"
trict and the pro<'eedir1p:c; had thereunder saYe and
except that the method of as~cssing the property
of the plaintiff wa,; not in aecordan<'c with the
. recNve
. d"
.
bene f tts
Ln Richcreek r. Jif)()rman. 4~ ::-.rortheastern 94:3, 14
Ind. App. 370, tl.c Appellate l'oud of Indiana upheld a
waiver executed by a propcrt,\· owner wai.\'inp: all illegalitie~ or irregularitier; in the proceedings and assessment
and signifying his intention to pay such a~sessment in {en
in~ial!meni~. 'l'llc wrriVI'I' wao: held f'ffedive in the faeP
ol' ob,icetiom; hy the pr·operty ownN ! hat surh waiver >m~
not effective.

A propeny owner could, if he chose, mortgage hi~
Jn·operty to pay the cO<:it of putting a driveway on it. It i:>
respectf'uJl_,. ,;ubmitted that the agreement to pay the
amount of the assessment and the agrPement that the re(jUest and waiver be binding upon tl1e signer and all subo'f"'luent owners of the property concerned, when properly
exPcuted, delin,•red and recorded, imposes a lien upon tlw
property for the proper proportionate share of driveway~
as~essed against the property owner even if it should be
held tlmt. the assessment for driveway purpo~e~ \nts not
effective. Such a lien was held to have been established
h~· a property owner when he signed an appropriate
:~"'sPssment agreement with a membership corporation i11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Colonial Financial Corporation v. Nelson, 264 N.Y.S. 139,
140

~\Ii~c.

55. Also see 5:3 C.J.S. 835, Liens, Se<.'ti.on 2b.
In any event plaintiffs should not be permitted to
~hallenge the validity of an assessment against their
property which they requested, for a driveway >dli~h they
requested on the grounds that their property alone will be
benefitted without benefit to the rest of the district.
POINT NO. Ill

THE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED BY SECTION 26 OF
CHAPTER 7 OF TfTLE 17, "CTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AS AM1£.t•;Dim, WOULD 1\0T CAUSE ANY VIOLATION OF
S.I!;CTION 3 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE L:TAH CONSTITUTIO:-:r, WlHCH PROVIDES FOR AN ELECTIO:-r ON TILE IK-

CURRil'>G OF INDEBTEDNESS BY CERTAIN GOVETtK_\lEKTAL SUBDIVISIONS.

As mentioned in paragraph 9 of defendants' answer,
the election requirement applies by its terms only to "any
county or subdivision thereof, ... any school district ...
any city, town or village, or any subdivision thereof in
ihi~ state .., None of these terms embraces Salt Lake
County Spedal ImprovE'.menl Dislrirt l\'umber 1.

The "Ctah Supreme Court has held on many occasions
that a district. created to contain part ofthe territory of a
county in which certain i nl[H"O\"l'llll'nt~ of various natures
were to be made and financed did not fall 11ithin tl1e purview of either Sectiou 3 or Section± of ~\.rticle H of the
Constitution. Lehi Cii!J 1 . .lfrifi11g, JS P. 2d 5:30, 81 Utah
237, held, with re~pect to a metropolitan ·water district
ereated under what is now Chapter t' of 'l'itle 1:3, as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"\Ve are sati s l'icd that. the metropolitan waLer
district is not a subdivision of either a city, town
or county within the meaning o[ ii•c· 11nrd 'subdivision' a~ used in the Constitution."
'J'he court then ·went on to hold that the mc•tropolitan
water district 11·a,; no! ~uhjrc·t io tlw limitations of either
the election requirement (Hedion 3) or the dchi limit
{Section 4) IJYovbion~ of !uticlf' 1+ of the Constitution.
In Pattrrick v. Onrl!on County Water Consr roatire
lJi.,fricl. HG 1'. 2d. 503, 106 n.ah 55, this eourt held that

the same constitutional provisions did not appl_v to a
water conservancy district created under Chaptt>r 9 of
Tille 73 or· the Utat• Code.

In Tygesen v. Magna T-Vater Co., 22fi P. 2d. 127, 119
Utah 274, the Supreme Court held likewise that an improvelllent di:'-tl·ict cJ'Cate:J under Chapter G of Title lJ
of the Uah Code is nol subjc<:t to these constitutional
limitation~

by the

IPTillfi

ol'

tho~c·

lin1itations.

ll should be noted that in the law~ creating carh of'
t:ll' three t:pr·~ or d;~l.ri:·l~ t;:(•n(ioned above tlte l~·gisla
ture did provide that an election must be held for tht>
creation o!' lndeht('d"-"~" and is>-uanee of bonU6. In ~o
providing the legi~latnre exercised scrupulous regard (r,
make sure thai indt>btedne~s ,\-as not imposed upon the
taxpayers of an area '1·ithout. their assent. at the polls,
even thm1gh no such assL'ilt was required ln· tlte Constitution. In the creation of special improvement districts
under Chapter 7 of Title 17 the legislature evidently did
not feel thai even those prineiple8, stricter than the conSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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stitutional requirements, which made it apply the election
requirements to the aforementioned districts would require the holding of an election in districts organi~ed
under said Chapter 7 for the issuance of special as$cs~
ment bond~ which would he payable from taxes only in

even! of a default in the collection of the assessments.
In contending that the county, by the creation of
this district and the ismance of bonds payable in the
manner specified, amount;; to the incurring of indebtedness by the county by rircumvention, plaintiffs disregard

the l'aet that it is not the county that pays the bonds.
'!'he bowh are to be paid only by the o·wners of property
in the distrid. and no obligation is imposed upon the
county as a whole. Plaintiffs :>trorJgest authority seem;;
to be the dissenting opinion in Barlow v. Clearfidd City
Corpo-ration, 268 P. 2d. 682,1 "C"tah 2nd 419. This dissent,
points out well and strongly the facl that under the
majority opinion the Legislature can provide for the
creation of districts to finance projects which counties
themselves, or cities, cannot finance. It is respedfully
submitted that if plaintiffs consider this an evil, their
remedy i~ to persuade the Legislature to repeal the la"-"
permitting the creation of o:uch distril'!o:, fo persuade
the county ofl'i('iaJs not to create sueh districts under the
lawH 11·hidt the Legislature passes or to attempt to amend
the Comtitution.
But even if it should be conceded that the provisions
of Scct.ion 3 of Article XIV apply to the distrid. the type
of securit~· proposed to be issued i;; not deUt within the
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meaning of said section. There J~ no obligation on !lw
part of the eounty to levy taxes in the di::;tr.ict until and
unless a default occurs in the payme11t of special assessments. Even then, the tax v,"'ill bt> levied only if it appears

that the amount of special assessments required to assure
prompt payment of princi1lal and in tcr·c~l falling due ·will
not be collected in time. In short, there is no obligation
at present and there will be no obligation upon the issuance of the bond~ for t.he c·ount~ to levy any taxes. If
it is neces;;ary to lev:· taxes in any year for such purpose
the tuxef' so levied in the then current year ·will be sufficient to extingni"h the obligation accruing in that year.
ScJ, even if th0 ohli,'-t:tlinn tn lr·\·y taxr•"' were debt, i1
would not he dehj "in r:;rc·fS of ta:..cs for tfte {'urrent
year,'" which requires an election llllder the Constitution.
TJickinsfJJ/ i'. S',r/1 ],akc Ci11j, 19:·J I'. 1110, 57 L'tah 530.

In any cv0nt, tJJP (jUestion of whether a promise to
lev:· taxP~ for the payment of special asse~sment bondi:l
in ca~e ol' a default ol' special assesRments <:onstitute~
debt under Hections 3 and 4 of Article XlY of the COJl~titution has already been anRwered by this eourt in
Wicks rs. 8at Lake City, 208 P. 538, 60 rtah 2f-i5. There,
under a (JUoted law, Salt Luke· City contemplated levying
a one mill tax throughout the r:it:> to raise l'unds for a
special improvement guaranty fund to pay maturing
special assessment bonds of a small lighting distriet within the eity upon the contingency that the assessments
collected be insufl'icicnt.
The plaintiff in the \Vicks case contended that the
.-tatute authorizing the raising of money by taxation to
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be placed in the guaranty fund wa;:. ·violative of the proviRions of Sections :1 and -l of Artiele XlV of the Utah
Con:>titution. In upholding the law the Court said:

"It mur;t he cunccded that these provi:>ions,
like every other provir;ion of the CoiiStitution, are
the paramount law of the :>tate concerning the
sub,jcds to which they relate. Any law enacted by
the Legislative in conflict therev.ith is null and
void, but the conflict must first be made to ap"
pear. If t.here i~ allY reasonable doubt about it,
the law will not be declared unconstitutional. Thi~
i.~ elementary doctrine ... To hold that a solelllll
ad of t}w Legislature intended to mpport and
mair1tain tlw eredit of the municipalities of t"he
state i8 urJc•on~titutional on ~0111e vague theory
that in its operation there is the bare~t possibility
of a continl.\·c-nc-y arising in 11 hich there may be an
in l'ringemer1t of the Const itntion i~ going further
than an.1 (·ase which has heretofore come under
my observation.''
It should l1e noted, by the 11·ay, that in Wicks v. Salt
Lake Cily the tax wa~ levied througlwul 11w rit;;- rather
than in ,jmt the area in which the special assessmei1ls
were le>ied.
It is :respedfully ~uhmitt.Pd, therefore-, t1mt the election requirl'llll'll\. of brl't ion 3 of .\rt iele .\:I\- of the Utah
Con;;titution doe;; not apply because t,a) Salt Lake
County Special Improvement IJist riet ~umber One is not
one of the entitie;; l'owreJ by that section and (b) the
obligations to he issued do not constitute debt within the
meaning of that section.
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POINT NO. IV
THE ISSUANCE OF THE BONDS PROVIDED BY CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 195::1, AS
A}IE~DED, DOES :'rOT VIOLATE THE DEB'T Lll\IITATIO~
OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE XIV OF THE LTAH CONSTITUTION.

For the rea~ons ~et out in Point IH above the provi~iorw of Article Xl'C, 8edion -±, ol' the l'tah Con6titution do nut apply to di.;;trictr-: of this ~ort or to lJoJld~ of
the type issued under Chapter I or 'l'ille 17 of the rtuh
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. It ~ltould be not.Pd
that the d0bt limit. section or Article.XIV of the t:onstitution (Section±) doe,; not afl'cct even as nmny governmental unitr; ar; the r.lection refjnirement ~:;ection (Section 3). Subdivi~ions
<:OUTitil'~. although mentiom~d in
Section 3 are not mentioned in Section 4.

or

Further, as meniinnrd above, the obligation LS primarily lu pay the bonds l'rom the pwceeds ul' the c·ollertion o-f the special assessments. TF·ic::ks v. i·}a./t Lake City,
.)'uvu. In that case, mentiom~d in Point III above, illP
court dedared at page 541:
"PlaintilJ dues not eontenU that it manifestly
appear::; that the Act of 1921 att('lllpt::; to authorize
the creation of an indebtedne::;s in excess of the
limit fixed by the Constitution, but the contention
seems to be that there i~ a vague and remote po~~i
hility that a literal compliance with the law may al
some time in the future result in the creation of
an indPhtednes9 in excess of the com;tih1iional
limit. \Ve seriously doubt if there is a sufficient
showing on the part of the plaintiff cmtcerning
this question to justify an extended discussion."
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Plaintiffs' contention that the law is unconstitutional
for failing to provide a method to determimo the application of the county debt limit to the diJ5trid renders the
act invalid iJ5 erroneous for the two reasons mentioned
above. If, however, the county debt limit did apply, it
would not be for the Legislature, by its ovm aet, to defilw
the area of ih application. This is a judicial function.
POINT NO. V
THE FACT THAT SECTION 26 OF CHAPTER 7 OF
TITLE 17, UTAH 'CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AS A}lENDED.
SPECIFIES THAT THE TAX TO GCARANTEE PAY.\iEl\T
OF THE BONDS BE LEVIED UPON REAL PROPERTY DOES
NOT RENDER THE ACT INVALID.

'!'he

fir~t (·a~c

relied upon by the plaintiffs in tho

corresponding part of tlH_.;r brid, CoHiiiifJ,!al Xafional

Bank of Sttlt Lake City v. Naylor, 179 P. 67, 54 rtah

conc•erned a bank

~uin{(

--1-!l

to enjoin the collection of prOJJ·

erty taxes levied agaimt it~ capital stock in the hand~
of it~ ~tockholder~. Thf' plaintiff bank alleged that the
Couuty Assessor had, in

a~sc~sing

criminated against hank stock as a

the bank

claf'.~

~tork,

dis-

of property and

as~f's~ed

it at a higher proportion of its yalue than other
types of property. The court found and held that although apparentl: some such di,.;c-riminatlon did exi::t,
the1·c wa~ no suh~lnntial evidence of intention or design
on the part of the as><e~sor or Board of Equalization to
discriminate against the plaintiff bank and other bank~
or stoekholders by the adoption of wrong principals,
~>tandards or methods or in any other respect. Therefore,
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the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the application for a perpetual injunction. It ::;hould
lw particularly noted that lhis case did not. involve an
attempt h_;· the Legislature hy general law to dassify
property for taxation according to the purp<bP of the
tax. Any di~crin1ination in taxation or a~::;c::;snwnts in
the situation involved in that mse was due to the County
A~~l'i:!SOr, in violation of ratl1c1· than in compliance ·with

statute.
The other case relied upon by plaintiffs to support
the contention of Point V of their brief is Kerr v. 1-t'ool!ty, 2-± P. 831, 3 Utah 456. There was no question in this
case of either as:>cssi11g or taxing different property at
different rates. The question was purely one of what
safeguards had to be in a t&-..::ing ::;tatute, and the coul'l.
held that the r;tatute involved was void because it provided for U"te crPation of o:rhool distrirtr; which would tax
at a rate determined by vote of t.h.e electors ·without regard to the need~ of the district, that there was no requirement of an oath or fidelity bond on behalf of the
trustees and no appeal was allowed the taxpayers for
tl1e equalization of fl~S<'P.Sm<'nts.

In providing ror the taxation of real property only,
m Section 17-7-26 the

Legi~lalnre

did Irnt pr·ovide fnr

any discrimination in amounts of assessed valnations or
in ratf's of leV}'. The taxation on real property will in
all event::; comply strictly with Lloc provisions of Sections
2 and 3 of Article XIII. The only (1ue~tion as to unifonnity arises from the fact that ol' all tangible property
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m the disJ.rid only real property will be taxed. The
que~tion the1r i.s •dtether the legi::!lature can so classify
propert.1 l'or taxation without violating the aforementioned con~lituhonal prohibitions.
For otdinary governmental purposes it would be
doubtful that the legislature could comtitutionall.1· so
das~ify pr·operty that one type of property bore rnore
than it~ proportionate share of the cost of operating the
govcmment than another type of property. However, in
the particular statute involved the taxation is not for the
purpose of the ordinary experu;es of running the government. The taxation iR only for the rmrpose of payi11g
part of the cost of certain local improvements to real
property. Tlw taxes arP to be levied only to cover a
failun: of thP ownero: of real property in the district to
pay thP bond;; through the medium of o:pecial asse~;;;
ments. 11 has long been recognized that the uniformity
requirements of tlw o:tatr constitution do not prohibit the
levy ol' ;;per,ial asse;;~uwnto: against real property only,
11he11 the purpo;;e of tlw lr\;;· is for a local improvement
or nature here rontemplaif'd. lf the la\1 provided that
all propt>rl ;.·, real:md personal, he taxed to mert a default
in ~pPtial n.;;;~p~~nwnt~ thf· pffeel would he to throw upon
I he prrsonal vropert;. ta"pa;. ers a burden which was to
be l1orne 1Jy tl1c re;1l proper!._Y tnxpnyens alone.
In Lundber:1

Y~.

(hen! Ril'fl·lrrigatiou DL,·trid, 119

P. 103il, 40 Utah :<3. the Supreme Court of rtah upheld
an act providing for the Jey;..- of a;.:sPilsments. on land in
an ir1·ip1lion

di~t1·iet

nt the rate of $7.50 per acre in
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spite of the plaint.iff's contention that since ::~ome land
in the district waR worth more per acre than other land
~nrh an a~sesslllcnl Yiolated the constitutional requirement that property be taxed uniFormly according to its
value. 'l'hc court held:
·'The answer to this contention ifl that, in
adopting lhc com;titutional provision referred to,
it was not intended that it should apply to ;;pecial
assessmen t fl. "
Delendanl;.; urge that the mere name "·lrich is given
to a govcnunenlal charge ~honld not alone determine
whether that charge i~ eonst.ilutional or not. If a <'harge
i~ in fad a special asse~sment it should be tr·catcd as
such although labeled a tax or, if it is in effeet a tax
though (·filled a etpc~cial asscs::;lrlcnt it shollid be treated
as a Ia\. II', H~ hc're, the charge partak(·~ part!;' of the
nature of a special assessment and partly of the nature
of a tax it r;honld he t.realed accordingly.

It i~ not jmt the name ··special assesr;ment"' that
exempts certain charges from the uniformity requirement, but the nature of those charg·c~ which are levied
for certain types of improvements which enhance the
value or· otherwise peculiarly improve real propert..'· in
a certain ~pecific territory. Special assf'R~men(s are an
exception to the ;::·encral r·u18 that all persons pay taxPs
according to some uniform measure of tllCir ability rather
than according to the benefit derived from the use to
which thP taxes are put.
Defendants maintain that when ad valorem t.axes
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are- levied for a purpose which will benefit only tl1e real

estate in a particular district the personal property may
constitutionally be relieved of the burden of such taxation. In Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroa-d Co. Y.
Cenfral Weber Sewer Improvement Didri!ct, 287 Pacifie
2d. 884, 4 l 1tah 2nd 105, plaintiff utility and railroad
companies obtained district court judgment whirlt e~
cluded certain real and personal property from a dislrid
organized under 'Chapter 6 of Title 17 of the Lltall'Cod~
Annotated 195:\ -.,vith power to levy ad valorem taxe~.
The solp reason for excluding the property from the
distrin was that it would not be benefited by the sewerage to he accompli~hed in the distrirt and therefore
should not be taxed. It appears that considerable real and
personal property of the plaintiffs was ·within the boundarie~ of the district. as originally created by the Boartl
of County Comisr;ionerr; of Weber County. In affinninp:
the decree of tlw trial court the Rupreme Court of Ftah
held "that ihc legislature h~d in mind burdening all
taxable vroperty in the district, if necessary, real or
personal, with the cost of the project, unlP~s it is sltown
by protest timely registered, or by review timely takf'n
that sndt real or personal property would not be beMI"iled directly by the improvemenh, in which event ~nrh
propf'rty ~hould he ext'luded from the dio;trid and remain
nontaxahlP." In .~o holding, defendanto; eontcnd, the SupreJne Court of l:tah rPcognized that tlt(' Legislature ran
eon~titntionall,,- fll!tlHlt'i7.C an ad valorem tax on property
of a benefited rlfl~~ while not k\'ied on propPrt~- of a
non-bctwfited rla~~ in the ~ame geograpltie arca. AISponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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though in the De11ver & Rio Grande <:aRe the non-benefited property ·was excluded from the dio;trict, this
exclusion was based only on the fact that it should not
be ta..;ed as the property wa.s in the territory surrounded
by the district's boundaries. The same effect is achieved

by the Legislature in Chapter 7 of Title 17 Ly provirling
that only the benefited vroperty (that is the real prop-

erty) be taxed to pay prineipal and interest on the bonds
in rase the as~t6~rnents levied against ~w:fl properlr
prove insnffieiPnt. Therefore defendantfl believe that this

{·ourt has in eirect already declared that lherc ean con:;titutionally be a tax -.,vhich, like the one under di8CU66iou,
partakes so much of the nature of a governmental charge
for an improvement peculiar to certain real pt·opedy
that it eomes >I ilhin the exeeption to the unifonnity rule
in 8r(·tion~ :! and 3 of Article XIII of the Utah Co;tstitution a;; that exception hac; been deFined by thi~ court.
Oelcndants further urge Jhat the tax provided by Section
17-7-JG, U.C.A., is ;.;ueh a tax. Also see .')'tate v. Cnrin!le
lJrai·nage District. lGG Par.ific 921, -tS l'tah 1, in which
t]te Ctah Supreme Court upheld a drainage distri<>t act
againo:t objections brought under the afor<>mentioned
uniformity provisions of the Constitution. 'l'he plaintiff
had alleged the act was invalid becaur;e it provided for
the taxation of lands "\\'i.thin a drainage district exclusive
of improvements thereon. ~'he oourt held that the a<>rcage
taxes \I"L·rt> special n.s;.;essmcnts and therefore the uniformity rule did not apply.

McQuillin Sttpra, vol. 1-1, p. 27 states

a.Jl

follows:
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"The late cases support the general proposition, ~ctt.lcd hy carliN decisions, that: t.he constitutional re11uirement. of equality and 1miformity
of taxalion has no application to asse~smcnts or
special taxation for local improvementf'. ln other
words, C'harges for the costs of a local improve"
ment. against the property benefited by ibc improvement, although an exercise of the ta:xing
power, are not such taxes as are referred to in
the various clauses of the comtitution and ihry
are neither embraced, nor intended to be embrtu'ed
in them.''
POINT NO. VI
THE SPECIAL TAX PROVIDED BY SECTION 26 OF
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AS AMEKDED, WOULD NOT BE TO PAY A PRIVATE DEBT
IN VIOLATIOK OF ANY SECTION OF THE UTAH CO::\STITUTION.

The paynwnt ol' the bonds i'rom

taxe~

would not

relieve an.\ defaulting proper·t.1· 011ner of his liability
to pay the a~se~sments levied against his property. Tlrcsr
taxe,; would be levied under Section 1 j" -I-:lfi. The law
provides that the proceeds of Uw tn),. be deposited in a
special improvement gnaran!.1 :·und applicable only to
the bonds of the dislr·ic-t and be' used solely for tlw purpo~e of paying prineipal of and interest on those bonds
a;; to "hir'h there would otherwise be default. 8cdinn
1"7-7-25 cnutcrnplah'~ that all money received from the
assl'~~nrr.'Trt~ when finally paid, or from the ~ale of land
to pay for such assessments, be held by the County
Treasurer and used solely to pay principal and interest
on the bond:;;, after the r'ost of the improvement ha~ been
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
paid for. If a property owner defaults in payrng his

special assessment and the ddault continues so long that
it is necesmry to levy the spee.ial tax, then, when the
defaulting property owner pay.~ hi::! assc~smcnt. or when
his property is sold, the proceeds of such pay"'Tilent or 8ale
on foreclosure would remain in the hands of the County
Treasurer and could be used only for paying the bond8.
When the bonds are finally paid, any money which re-

mains in t.he hands of the County Treasurer should be
treated as money in the special improvement guaranty
fund to he rebated to the then owners of the real property
in the distriet in the same proporti-ons as tJw aggregate
amount of tlw taxes previously paid by the then and
former ov.'llers of ear.h ~UI'h piece of real property beaTs
to the total taxi.'» paid by the owners of all real pt·o}Jerty
in such dislriet during the life of the bonds. Thus, it is
~een !hat the taxpayers would not he required to pay anyone's private debts. They would be required to pay under
eertaiu circumstances principal of and interest on bonds
><liich could haY!' bcc·n r.1wJe pu;·able from taxf'fl on their
property 1\ilhout the use of special a~ser;sment:; at all.
The case of Nelson vo;. Board of ClimmL~s-1:oners IJl
Davis County, :!l.S P. 952, 62 rtah :.n 8, relied upon by
the plaintiffs was not decided on the ground that one

taxpayer should not be compelled to pay the defaultiJlg
assessments of another. Indeed, the
opposite and specil'ieflll_v

ca~e

held lhe exact

pcnnii~cd as~e~sments,

up to

an increase of 15~{-, to be levied lor just such purposes.
The holding of the Ntlson ease was that since the statnt1.~
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prohibited further levies they could not be made. Additionally, the court held that all charges levied hy the irrigation district were special .assessments and not general
taxes. The quoted language appearing in plaintiff's brief
supports that conclusion, ·whe1·e it says Ihat "a landovt'lleJ'
cannot m1d should not be penalized further than is pro1'ided ht the act for h-is pro-rata sharP of rfelinquencirs
of other p1·operty o-wners in failing to pay the tax against
their property."
Defendants submit that the comtitutional power of
the Legislature to provide for a special assessment guaJ·anty fund payable from taxes has already been settled
by thi~ court in lVichs v. Salt Lake City, cited above.
POINT NO. VII

THE SPECIAL TAX LEVY TO PAY BONDS WHE)I
NECESSARY TO PREVENT DEFAULT CAN BE MADE
WTTHOU'J' VIOLATING THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF
'THE FOURTEENTH AliiENDr.IENT TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTIO~ OR SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE 1 OF
TIIE UTAH CO:-l"STITUTIOX

Find, it r;honld he noied that tl1c'~l' ta:-..0~ art' to be
levied no[ arrording to the llenef'it dcriYed Uy earh pierl'
of' proper(_\, 'l'h1·.1· are to be levied on an ad valorew
hn~is, and tflv'~ so le1·ied do not require a hearing on
benefit:-. KP!Iff v. T'ilto·l!argli. 10-! r.s. IS, ~tl Law~·f'n
Edition C.JS. Jforton Salt Co. v. rity of South H1dthi11so11, 1/'i Fed. 2d. 889. Plaintiffs' brief <.'Olltend~ that the
tax •·j, either a r;pecial tax or an n~~c-~~~~~ent. a:nd the
defendanto: should not he allo,\·ed to treat it as an ao~I'S:<ment. io p:Pt around the I'On~titutional limitation:;
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which would apply if it were a tax and then turn around
and treat it as a tax .in order to get around the constitutional limitations ·which ·would apply if it i:; an assessment." This is rather Like saying that a mule must be
either a horse or a donkey. As prc\'iously mentioned in
this b1·id', the t.a.x partake~ of the naturE' of a ~1weial
assessment to the L'l..l(•nl that it. is lPvied only against
the class of property benefited but partakes of the nature
ol' a genPral tax to the extent that upon the dass of property lwnerited it acts on an ad valorem basi;; rather than

a benefit lJasi~. For this reason the tax is not. a J'Casscssment.
In the Improvement

Di~trict

Law (Chaptc•r 6 ol' 'ritlc

11 of the nah Code El53) upheld m Denrn· & Ilio
Grande Western Railroad Cornpany v. Central TVdnr
Seu:er Improvement Disft·ici_. cited above, the only hearing required \vas the initial hearing to determine whether
the property to hf' included in the diiitriet would be benefited by the irnprovements to be made. i-'r·uperty o-wners
were not permitted to show that their prorrerty would be
benefited in an amount less than tlte amount of ad valorem taxes to be levied on their property because, as
mentioned above, no hearing is required prior to the Jc-vy
of taxes on an ad valorem ba.sis. In thal case the Utah
Supreme Court held that the tax on benefited pt"operty
wa~ valid even Jhough certain other property in the Jcrritoriallimits of' the district. was excluded from the district and taxation thereby for Jack or benefit.
However, even if it should be held that the taxi~ a
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form of as&essrnent or reassessment to the extent that it
requires a hearing, the pruvision for the tax was in tlw
law at the time of the hearing in April 1958, and all
property ownerc; were presumed to know that law. 'rhe
fact thai they did not

rai~e

any question then

preclude~

any further action or requirement of hearing.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Uta],
in Wicks v. Salt Lake City, cited above, upheld the tax
to guarantee special assessment bonds without even
que~tioning whether a new ru:;sessment was involved.
'l'hc authoritie;; cited by plailltiff;; support only tbe
proposition that in order to lRvy special as;:.essln(•nt:.:
aceording lo benefits a hf'aring m\Jst be held. With thio
contention \\C agree. ln all of the cited cases, Lhe amount
of the rharge which hpcame a lien upon the property wa~
detPrmined not on an ad valorem basis, as here, h11t by
the amount of hPnPfit or service receivpd hy the property.
POINT NO. VIII
THE PRIORITY OF ASS~SSMENTS PROVIDED BY
SUCTIO;;..:r 17-7-19 UTAH CODL ANNOTATED. 1953, AS
A!I-IEKDED, IS NOT INVALID A~D DOES NOT INVALI·
DA'I'F: THE AC'I'.

Apparently plaintiffs feel that the assessment~ to
be levied under Section 17-1-19, t'.C.A., 1953, can not
have tile parity of lien mentioned in that section. Plaintit"!~ have failed to citP and defendants can not find any
eonstitutionnl pro,·ision which would be violated by the
assessment o;' canying thP same priority of lien as general
taxP~, and in tlw ah~ence ol such a constitutional proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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vision, the legislative ad must be allowed to stand.

The fact that it may conflict. with other previously
enaded statutes does not, of course, make the aforementioned Section 19 invalid. The ca,;es cited by plaintiffs
J.ealt with situation~ -..,vhere the priuril) of lien was not
spetil'ied by statute. In thic; case the most recently en.c:.,·ted statute, which is the aforementioned Chapter I
prevailf'. Rection 19 of that chapter provides that special
assE'f'f'mE'nts rank on equalily with general taxes, and,
as mentioned in defendants' Answer, the assessments arc
to rank on an equality with taxes levied againf't the
property involved for the same year or years in which

the installments fall due.
In any event the severability clau::~e in Sedion 19 of
Chapter :12 of the Laws of 1957, which appears irnrnediatd~· after Seetion17-7-28, l~.C.A. would require a severance of the priority of lien provision if it ~hould he found
invalid, without affecting the rest of the act. '!'hi::; severabiliJy clause reads as follows:
"If any one or more provunons of this act
or lhe application thereof to any person or circumst.ance :;;hall ever be held by an)· court to be
invalid the remaining provio;ions hereof and their
application to persons or circumstance other than
those to wJ1ich they have lJeen held to be invalid
shall not be affected thereby."
So if it should be held that the Section 19 of Chapter 9
is invalid, ~uch invalidity ·would not an'ect the rest ol' the
act and there is pending no question as to the pl'iority
of any lien:;; at the present time.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
POINT NO. IX
CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 17, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953, AS AMENDED, IS NOT SO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN
AS TO BE INOPERATIVE AND VOID.

A:-; specified in defendants· Answer, the chapter i~
not void for vagueness. The bonds will he tho~e of the
Board of County Commissioners issued on behalf of the
district by said Board in its capacity as governing authority of the district. 'I' he Jaw shows quite clearly upon
what propert;, and whom the assessments and taxes are
to be levied, and by what body they arc to Ue levied.
Plaintiffs cite no question of :-;ubstanec, whieh will affect
the rights of any person, whi(']J j:-; not answered wifh
adPquate clarity br tlw tennc: of tl1c aet.
While it is true that when a statute i~ so vague and
nncPrt.ain as to hP unenforceable the court will not enfore,; it, this statute iF sufficiently clear, the right~ of
all parties are ndeqnf!.tPly "lweified and there i~ no
quc~tion but 11·hat ii can be enforced.
50 _Anl. Jur. --l-S6 cited by plaintiffs in their brief
sets dmrn a rule for measuring whether a statn(P i.<
constitutional wit.h which we heartily agree. It i~ a~ followr;:
"In determining whether a ~tntute is void for
unePrtaintr, thP :::tatutt> should be considered as a
whole."
In appl~-illg" thi~ l"nle to Chapter I we are convinced
thai the law ~tands thl' te~l. Fai1·l~ and reasonably con~idNed, the statutf\ it i~ submitted, i~ not so vague and
unceetuiu n~ to he inoperativE' and void.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29
POINT X
IN THE EVENT THAT ANY ONE OR MORE PORTIONS
OF THE ACT SHOULD BE HELD INVALID THE REMAINDER SHOULD BE UPHELD.

In Point VIII above, defendants ~et out the severability clause appearing in Section 19 of the act. The rule
adoptf'd by tile Utatt Supreme ·Court i~ that if a statute
is in part constitutional and in part illlconstitutional the
unconstitutional parts alone will be stricken unle~s, by
~tdking them, it wtdU be ilrlpo~;.;ible to give cfl'0d to
the apparent intent of the Legislature. Stillman v. Ly:nch,
192 P. 272, 56 Utah 540. In that case the <'onrt upheld
the general taxing laws of Utah while striking a provision for an unconstitutional deduction from asr;essed
valuation of bank stocks.
It i~ respectfully mhmitted that if, under Point H
of Plaintiffr;' and dei'Pndanis' b1·iel'~ the court ~hould
detennine that driveways are for a private purpose
purely find not sufficiently a pnblic pnrpMe to suppor't
the levy of special asser;pnwntR, the eourt should hold void
only ~o much of the r,tatule and .,;hould enjoin only ;;o
mn('h of the proceedings as relates to driveways.
If 1mdcr Point IH the court should hold that the

levy of taxes to pay the bonds in ('ase of default of
special assesRmen(,.;

('(_lll~l.itutr.;~

debt. in

exces~

of taxes for

the current year in violation or Sedion 3 ol' Article XIV
of the Constitution, unless an election iR held, defendanh:
pray the court to enter a decree holding that before any
such taxes can be levied or bonds is.,;ued pledging the
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taxing power to the ext.cnl specified, an election must

be- held in the district under the provisions of law relating to the indebtedness of counties, and such election
mu;;f cany.

If Fnder Point IV the court should determine that
the bonds ~ecured by the levy of taxes when nece~~an
to prevent default violates the debt limit provi~ion of
Section 4 of Article XIV of the U.ah Con~tiiution, defendant<; pray the court in its deerPP lo ~pecify how the
limitation is to be applied and should o;pecify that bond8
not be i~~ued in exce~"' or that limit.

I r UTldcr Points 'i-, YI or \'II the court

.~l1ould

de-

termine that the special tax for payment of bonds whicl1

would otherwise default cannot be levied at all 1rithom
violating the Comtitution of the State of Utah, defendants pray thP court to Pnter a decree holding valid all of
the act except for 8cetion2G of Chapter 7, as that

~edion

!av'~,

can be

alone, 'drich providP.'i for the levy of such

held void without affecting the remainder of the act. Tn
case such a dce1·ee should enter it should specify that
the bond~ be payable from the levy of special as~e~~
ments.
If under _Point Y the rourt ~hould find that the tax
violate~ the uniformil) proYisinn~ of the rtah Constitution in Section>< :l nnd 3 or· Article XIII hy the levy of
tnx1·~ upon real prnpL•rt~- only, the defendam~ pray th~
court to hold that the tuxP~ must be lrYied on all taxable
property in the district.
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CONCLUSIO);f
Defendants submit that for the reasons set forth in
Point.s I through IX above, Chapter 7, 'l'it.lc 17, L'tah
Code Annotated, 1953, as amende:J, is constitutional and

valid and that the decree of the DiRtrkt ·Court should"be
affirmed and defendanl_.s should be allowed their costs
herein.

In the event, however, that the Court holds any one
or more portions of Chapter 7 invalid the remainder
should be upheld as o:et forth in "Point X above.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM 'I'. 'I'Hl~R~\IAN
Attorney .for Defendants and
Respondn~ts

720 )J"ewhouse Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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